In 1980, as the Cold War was reintensifying, Bull, now back in Oxford, launched a stinging attack on Moscow and Washington for ignoring their Great Power responsibilities to international society, including their retreat from arms control.9 But barely half a decade later, and a year after Bull’s untimely death in 1985, John Lewis Gaddis described in his essay, ‘The long peace’, the rules of the game that both the United States and the Soviet Union had adhered to in order to maintain a measure of stability in their otherwise hazardous relationship.10 Bull might well have agreed with Gaddis here as he had a strong tendency to disagree with himself. Managers with weak . The Australian National University, Canberra Washington and Moscow might have defined strategic stability in less than identical ways, but their arms control agreements reflected their joint assessment that they had a common interest in regulating a major aspect of their Cold War competition.3 Both saw mutual survival as a core interest, to use a term that has become associated with the foreign policy of today’s China. My assessment, which should probably not surprise any of us, is that the China–US strategic interaction was the most important of these system-wide factors.19. The main point is that cooperation can coexist with competition. There is also enough evidence to suggest that they can work together to manage the interaction of their coercion—think of their cooperation after the EP-3 spy plane incident and the now fairly regular management of some fairly hairy moments on the high seas. This is a mutual commitment to use coercion rather than war itself as a way of managing the conflict, and indeed as a way of avoiding severe escalation to war. Fifty years after the Centre was founded in 1966, SDSC celebrated its continued research, publications, teaching and government advisory role with a two-day conference entitled ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’. Today we are probably even more comfortable with the argument that the major nuclear powers needed to see themselves as partners in avoiding mutual annihilation. In order to understand what the strategic framework looks like in action, you need to dissect it. It can remind us what strategic studies is about. To establish that position is no reason to take our eyes away from the still hazardous strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. The military as an element of national power. The prospects for a Great Power ‘grand bargain’ in East Asia, 6. Moreover, evidence of threats of force are not difficult to find. The military as an element of national power, 5. This was a year before the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I) talks, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, would be completed successfully, a formal sign of the ability of the two superpowers to set limits on their nuclear competition. People tend to try to squeeze strategic planning discussions in between putting out fires and going on much needed vacations. They were, in other words, adverse partners (a term I do not think Schelling himself quite came to use). There has been no major power war in Asia for decades, and the commitment of the United States and China to avoid war in their own relationship needs mentioning here. 11 Marshall Shulman, ‘What does security mean today?’, Foreign Affairs 49, no. An adverse partnership also implies that even when we do see great powers working together, we should not be fooled into thinking that they are no longer adversaries. Strategic Thinking In A Crisis. Strategic Thinking and Exploration . 13. STRATEGIC THINKING Jim Clawson University of Virginia. But, as Bull argued, these agreements were but symbols of the deeper recognition of common interests that constituted the limited understanding between East and West. But he argued that there was nothing permanent about this situation, which he therefore referred to as an accident of history. And few expect major war between the United States and China to be around the corner, even if some feel the tensions between them are growing. Otherwise, a linear, incremental plan will do little more than maintain the status quo, like treading water. This is worth remembering if we think that all the great powers have to do in the 21st century to run an adverse partnership is to attend to their relationships of economic interdependence. The Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) is Australia’s premier university-based strategic studies think tank. Do whatever it takes to allow that time for big-picture thinking (including taking your team off-site). Save up to 80% by choosing the eTextbook option for ISBN: 9781000263022, 1000263029. The core course in that original master’s degree was dominated by a subject that has largely disappeared from today’s teaching in strategic studies. 6. They pay only neglectful attention to market trends and listen to customers . We forget how revolutionary it was to argue that the two supposedly implacable foes could also be seen as partners. It is the conscious regulation of conflict as a fact of international life, whether in wars hot or cold or somewhere in between. The print version of this textbook is ISBN: 9780367621551, 036762155X. I wonder how much of an adverse partnership is really there. 5–10. The theme was crisis management, and our teacher that day was Coral Bell. The two main powers remained in a more or less oligopolistic position, although in Asia, with China’s emergence, more of a triangle emerged. 1 See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 1971, p. 50n. I say that because there is not a great deal of evidence for formal security collaboration. The decline of the classical model of military strategy, 4. It would be wrong to suggest that this theme was recognised consistently by all who adopted it, or that each one of the scholars mentioned here saw the adverse partnership operating in the same fashion. 15. The intention is to break the confusing circle ... of thinking about management strategy. Old wine in new bottles? In the last few years, the United States, alongside its allies Japan and Australia, have accused China of using coercion to change the maritime status quo in East Asia, in both the South and East China Seas. Principle among those common interests was the avoidance of major war, which the presence of nuclear weapons would make especially catastrophic. Slideshare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising. strategic course so long as the present strategy produces acceptable results. Containment was possible, we might think, because they were members of separate economic systems: one open and liberal, the other closed and centralised. Beyond ‘hangovers’: The new parameters of post–Cold War nuclear strategy, 9. CRICOS Provider : 00120C An obvious and necessary question to ask is whether this formulation does have continued relevance. Horner. This is not the end of the world. My final point here is that the idea of an adverse partnership can do more than tell us a good deal about the US–Soviet strategic interaction during the Cold War. This does not mean that they cannot have such an understanding. When I ask my undergraduate students for their first political memory, for some of them it is 9/11. It meant that the fostering of an adverse partnership was not desirable. In 1971 he argued: security in the realm of strategic weapons would be best served by a stable equilibrium at as moderate a level as can be managed through explicit or tacit agreement with our adversaries. This interdependence is not the guarantee of a commitment to conflict management that some might want to think. Robert O’Neill and D.M. Fifty years after the Centre was founded in 1966, SDSC celebrated its continued research, publications, teaching and government advisory role with a two-day conference entitled ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’. And it can do even more than offer us some good questions to ask about great power strategic relations today. 3, 1980, pp. “Think of models as a way of ideating strategy. Bernard Brodie’s famous warning in 1946 that from now on armed forces must be used to prevent war rather than prosecute it7 had indicated that nuclear weapons, if not managed properly, could make Clausewitz’s philosophical category all too real. Looks like you’ve clipped this slide to already. 17 For one significant depiction of their other than zero-sum relationship, see Rosemary Foot, ‘China and the United States: Between cold and warm peace’, Survival 51, no. Had it not been for the encouragement from Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) academics who had taught me here in Canberra, I expect I would have had little chance of working in London with Lawrence Freedman, whose enthusiasm for the history of strategic ideas continues to be a major inspiration to me. Your browser is not supported by ANU web styles. I do not want the United States and China to be more scared of one another than they need to be, but you have to wonder whether they are quite scared enough. This feature only reinforced their dominance of the international system. In reading her slim volume, The Conventions of Crisis, while I was on sabbatical here in 2013, one concept stood out to me as an approach to understanding the management of Great Power crises. Strategic leadership is the process of providing the direction and inspiration necessary to create or sustain an organization. Cold War strategic concepts played a significant part in my time as a student at The Australian National University (ANU). Yet I wonder whether there is a problem here. I say this because at the heart of the adverse partnership is the management of conflict. 4. 1, 1965, pp. The continued relevance of Cold War strategic concepts. But in the late 1950s, when a fairly young American economist was asserting that the nuclear-armed superpowers had common interests (as well as competitive ones), he was actually explaining a point of departure for post-war strategic studies. The two sides meet regularly at the US–China Economic and Strategic Dialogue. In the second decade of this new century, we are not as surprised as some Cold War audiences might have been about the possibility of adverse partnerships.17 After all, we are all aware of the close economic relations that the United States and China enjoy, which give them a common economic interest the Russians and Americans largely lacked. The two sides can work together without counting rules, without incidents at sea agreements and even without China’s involvement in whatever will become of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, p. 46. Strategic studies in practice: An Australian perspective, 10. Their limited cooperation is much more about coexistence than friendship. A bias for action? We know that Bull also favoured the logic of adverse partnerships even though he also probably did not use the term. These partners remain adversaries. Nor do they need the East Asia Summit to do the impossible and create some real institutional legs. They recognise a common interest in avoiding war in the East China Sea, and in ensuring through compatible unilateral signalling that Tokyo does not push either of them too far in that direction. John J. Frewen. Strategic Decision Making. That coercion includes the United States’ freedom of navigation patrols, its extended deterrence commitments to key regional allies and its strengthening of defence cooperation with South Korea to forestall a greater challenge from North Korea. 99–142. But some of them do not even remember that far back. July 1966 saw the founding of The Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC). Fifty years after the Centre was founded in 1966, SDSC celebrated its continued research, publications, teaching and government advisory role with a two-day conference entitled ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’. New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0. +61 2 6125 5111 It is easy to forget that some of the crises that were survived in the Cold War could have become very serious. I owe a great deal to those half dozen nuclear strategy lectures and to the wonderful academic who delivered them: Professor Desmond Ball. A number of these themes had been explored by Schelling, including in T.C. A third factor is that these threats of force and other signals were used to sustain the central agreement on which the partnership relied. Just as some see the Cold War as an especially difficult and competitive period of international politics, which today’s Asia cannot afford to repeat, some others are tempted to look back nostalgically on an era that was not nearly as simple or stable as they might think. In Asia’s Security, I was looking for those factors that linked the wider region together in security terms. The economic interconnectedness between China and the United States is at least partly an accident of economic history. 4, 1971, p. 617. This was an idea that Bell said she had borrowed from the Soviet specialist Marshall Shulman.1 It was to view the relationship between the main Cold War protagonists, the US and the Soviet Union, as an adverse partnership. Crisis management among the great powers, often against the risk of nuclear annihilation if these crises were mismanaged, runs through a good deal of Bell’s work. It had become essential. One applies to our own fading memories of the Cold War period, memories that we now seldom have in common with the majority of our students, who were born some years after the Berlin Wall was torn down. This coercion on the part of China and the United States is not one of Hedley Bull’s accidents of history. But the idea that the principal adversaries of that era can be regarded as partners as well as competitors suggests that this view is false. 3, 1967, pp. Schelling’s book, still hugely influential, is The Strategy of Conflict. And a fourth stems from that: the incredibly high stakes of the game that was being played. See my analysis in Robert Ayson, Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012. It helps us remember that, although these tensions were very serious and dangerous, they did not lead inevitably to war. Now customize the name of a clipboard to store your clips. Sound strategic thinking doesn’t have to remain an abstract mystery only a few are able to realize. The event saw the podium graced by many of the world’s premier thinkers in the strategic … Strategic thinking is an ability to envisage new solutions to old problems, and to constantly reinvent your point of view in a way that is unique, and benefits the purpose of your organisation. Such signals [she added] are not necessarily verbal messages. It is conscious activity designed to influence the expectations and behaviour of the other side, and to influence the expectations and behaviour of others in the region. A primary focus for their limited cooperation is the conscious management of the conflict that exists between them, avoiding its escalation into a situation that both of them will regret. Strategic leadership: the ability to anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, and empower others to create strategic change as necessary. Let me explain what I mean courtesy of the most obvious early 21st-century test case for an adverse partnership, nothing other than today’s Great Power interaction between the United States and China. Lawrence Freedman identifies this logic perfectly when he argues, in his epic Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, that ‘[a]t the centre of the strategy of stable conflict was the concept of incomplete antagonism’.5 The follow-on from that statement is that the incomplete antagonism provided an opportunity for managing the conflict. And that concept is my focus in this chapter. ABN : 52 234 063 906. This essentially means looking at the definition of strategy and how it can be linked to leadership. Furthermore, you need to examine the purpose of strategic leadership, as it can 6, 2009–10, pp. Strategy to Schelling was a question of manipulating risk, but this logic worked only if you thought the other side had an interest in keeping the competition within limits. The authors present an overview of strategic planning, examine its history and mystique, and conclude that planning, if properly implemented, can have a powerful impact on advancing and transforming colleges and universities. How that relationship evolves, and what it means for Asia’s security, and what that then means for Australia, will be the most important set of connected questions for many of the next 50 years of the SDSC. And why is the idea of an adverse partnership important? STRATEGIC ISSUES A Strategic Issue is any issue that significantly influences a person’s, a work group’s or an organization’s ability to develop and maintain a competitive advantage. Rich Horwath is the CEO of the Strategic Thinking Institute, leading executive teams through the strategy process and training more than 100,000 managers on strategic thinking. Moreover, for great powers like China and Russia that remain outside the US alliance system, there is the convenient argument that these alliances reflect an obsolete Cold War mentality. Table of Contents. On this point, the interests of the two countries are not opposed, but on neither side is this fact yet fully appreciated.11. attempts to set new directions for the orga nization. 123–46. Slideshare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising. Every new author, speaker, or thinker you encounter can teach you something new about the way you think--and introduce you to new facts and ideas you can integrate into your own critical thinking… The Strategic Thinking Framework is a good place to start when deciding on a common approach to strategy. This was the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and, in our case, there was a particular focus on the development of US nuclear strategy. A bias for action? New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0. This precocious scholar, who took up his ANU chair a year after the SDSC was established, argued that the great powers had a special responsibility to recognise and nourish their common interests in the working of an international society. And it was the concept of stability in the Cold War period, and specifically Tom Schelling’s work on that idea, that formed the topic of my PhD thesis at King’s. Bull saw that a fairly crude equilibrium of power in the form of the balance of terror had been created by the superpower arms race. In fact, you likely won't be promoted, and can't succeed as a leader without it. The continued relevance of Cold War strategic concepts, 7. The crucial point is that so much of the conflict management that did occur did not happen through carefully calibrated exchanges of actual violence––it was conflict management through coercion and the management of that coercive diplomacy itself. It is to regard adversaries, even when they are very serious rivals, as possible partners. Appendix 1: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 50th anniversary celebratory dinner keynote speech: ‘To see what is worth seeing’. Automation is purposely put as Step 7 on the 9-step framework, to make sure that the proper emphasis is placed on strategic thinking and strategy development before "software seduction" sets in. Managers of successful businesses do more than simply find a way to make money and sell stuff. Horner from Waterstones today! There is nothing harmonious here. Old wine in new bottles? 12 Marshall Shulman, ‘Toward a Western philosophy of coexistence’, Foreign Affairs 52, no. American grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, 12. At least initially, the third factor seems to be met without any question. 2016 marks the 50th anniversary of SDSC’s founding and the 25th anniversary of the Cold War’s ending. Most of these positions say much more about political preferences than they do about accurate perceptions of the situation. The United States, the Soviet Union and world order’, International Journal 35, no. Conclusion: What is the future of strategic studies? So what does, or perhaps what did, an adverse partnership consist of, and why was it important? One of the reasons for these concerns is connected to the fourth factor: that the Cold War adverse partners had seen the abyss in the Cuban Crisis and were aware what was at stake should their conflict not be managed. Is there more room today than there was in the Cold War for that to be happening? An adverse partnership requires a measure of crisis stability that we might wonder about. But therein lies a potential problem. 25–6. 15 Bell, The Conventions of Crisis, p. 49. The event saw the podium graced by many of the world’s premier thinkers in the strategic … For their benefit, it concerns me when the Cold War is stereotyped because of academic laziness or because of the simplification of complex history to serve geopolitical agendas. If you continue browsing the site, you agree to the use of cookies on this website. Robert Ayson. But to create a strategic plan, your team needs time to think big. But unlike Beijing’s assertions today, it was a core interest the two sides had in common. An Asian school of strategic studies? Hence, the first consideration regarding the adverse partnership seems in much better nick today than in the era of East–West strategic interaction. There might also have been something of a tacit understanding to deflect the competition into other areas, including the fighting of proxy wars, the competition for allies and the arms race itself. Tacit signalling, as opposed to formal negotiation, mattered a great deal. Washington and Beijing recognise that they have a common interest, for example, in not allowing their South China Sea grandstanding to escalate to war. Let me give two answers to that question. 1, 1973, p. 38. That possibility did cross my mind. All of these perspectives could be right, of course. That abyss was created by an intense competition for nuclear parity that we do not see in the more asymmetric US–China nuclear interaction. If there is such a common underlying commitment to keeping their own conflict within limits, that is well and good. If the extent and quality of the China–US adverse partnership affects the rest of us, what does this mean in reverse? To use Schelling’s terminology, to which I am somewhat addicted, the adverse partnership was as much tacit and informal as it was explicit and formal. Orders over £20 New Haven, 1966, p. 73 underlying commitment keeping... A Western philosophy of coexistence ’, Foreign Affairs 49, no what Hedley Bull once said Schelling. 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